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ABSTRACT: This study examines the correlation between corporate governance, 
environmental responsibility, and firm value in Indonesia and Malaysia. This study 
extends the literature in consideration of the role of environmental responsibility 
in indirect correlation between corporate governance and firm value. The 
environmental responsibility data index is calculated by conducting a content 
analysis of companies’ annual and sustainability reports in 2013. The other data 
are obtained from the database of OSIRIS, Bursa Malaysia (Stock Exchange of 
Malaysia), and Bursa Efek Indonesia (Indonesia Stock Exchange). The results show 
that corporate governance influences the company’s decision in performing 
voluntary activities such as environmental responsibility. This study shows that 
Malaysian and Indonesian markets do not respond to environmental 
responsibility information. It may be considered that the public in Malaysia and 
Indonesia lacks awareness of the importance of environmental responsibility.  
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Introduction 
 
Profit (financial performance) is currently not the only aspect a company 
should pay attention to. There is social and environmental responsibility a 
company must fulfill in order to continue its operation and obtain society’s 
support. This statement is supported by Jo and Harjoto (2012), that the 
purpose a company performs social and environmental responsibility 
activities is not only to gain profit, but also because of ethic reasons and in 
fulfillment of their social obligations. 
 
Social and environmental responsibility activities are still low and 
voluntary, particularly in developing countries. An increase of investment 
in developing countries (US SIF, 2012) causes increasing environmental 
exploitation in those countries. This is the background of the researcher’s 
assumption that environmental responsibility issues in developing 
countries are higher than in any other countries. This research takes 
Indonesian and Malaysian companies as its samples since both countries 
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have the highest pollution level in Southeast Asia in 2013 (http://data.worldbank.org/). 
Corporate governance and firm value are one antecedent factor and implication a 
company takes into consideration when it decides to perform environmental 
responsibility (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, & Hughes, 2004; Alsaeed, 2006; Gamerschlag, 
Möller, & Verbeeten, 2010; Jo & Harjoto, 2011). Spitzeck (2009) states that the 
corporate governance system requires a manager not only to pay attention to 
shareholders’ interest but also that of stakeholders in general (stakeholder theory). The 
legitimacy theory also states that a company cannot be separated from social context; a 
company has a social contract with its surrounding environment (Holder-webb, Cohen, 
Nath, & Wood, 2009). A company will improve its environmental responsibility if it is 
supported by a good governance system. 
 
Based on the stakeholder theory, a company is not only responsible economically (to 
shareholders), but also non-economically to other concerned parties. Corporate 
survivability depends on the support given by all stakeholders; depends on how the 
company manages its relationship with customers, employees, suppliers, society, 
community, investors, etc. (Freeman & Phillips, 2002). A company which performs 
environmental responsibility is deemed to be fulfilling such non-economic obligation, 
which thus leads to increasing firm value, a determinant of corporate survivability. 
 
The correlation pattern of corporate governance, environmental responsibility, and firm 
value is unclear in developing countries. Previous research (Jo & Harjoto, 2012) tests the 
correlation in the US and finds that there is an indirect correlation between corporate 
governance and firm value, which is social and environmental responsibility serving as 
mediator. This research differs from previous research (Jo & Harjoto, 2012) in some 
ways. Jo and Harjoto (2012) test the correlation in developed countries context (US), 
while this research desires to fill the research gap by testing the correlation pattern of 
governance, environmental responsibility, and firm value in developing countries 
(Indonesia and Malaysia). According to Tsamenyi et al. (2007), different characteristics 
between developing and developed countries may cause a difference in different 
governance correlation models. The previous research obtains CSR measurement from 
the database of Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini’s (KLD’s) Stats, while this research 
develops environmental responsibility activity disclosure index through content analysis 
based on GRI G4 guideline. This research is going to test the correlation between 
corporate governance, environmental responsibility, and firm value in developing 
countries simultaneously. Social and environmental responsibility is deemed an agency 
conflict resolution set which may increase firm value.  
 
This research contributes to social responsibility literature, particularly in the 
environmental aspect, in developing countries. This research tests how corporate 
governance and environmental responsibility simultaneously influence firm value. This 
research tests the correlation between corporate governance and environmental 
responsibility in Indonesia and Malaysia because, in the globalization era, Indonesia and 
Malaysia start to attract investment opportunity which will affect their environment in 
the long run. This research also tests how corporate governance and environmental 
responsibility influence Indonesian and Malaysian non-tested companies’ performance. 
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Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Agency Theory 
 
The agency theory explains the relationship of two parties, principal as employer and 
agent as an employee. Principal as shareholder delegates the decision making authority 
on their behalf tot he agent (manager) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The issue arising from 
this principal-agent relationship is a conflict of interest, in which the agent does not 
always decide on the principal’s interest. This theory also reflects information 
asymmetry between the manager as the agent and shareholder as the principal. 
Information asymmetry arises when the agent (manager) has more information than 
the principal and the other stakeholders. This information asymmetry will decline if the 
agent discloses the information. Corporate governance is considered to be able to 
oversee and control the agent so as not to perform moral hazard behavior and to make 
the disclosure. Declining information asymmetry will increase firm value. 
 
Stakeholder Theory 
 
This theory states that a company is not an entity which operates only for its own 
interest, but it should provide the stakeholder's benefits. A company is not only 
responsible economically (to shareholders), but also non-economically to other 
concerned parties. Corporate survivability depends on the support given by all 
stakeholders; depends on how the company manages its relationship with customers, 
employees, suppliers, society, community, investors, etc. (Freeman & Phillips, 2002). A 
good corporate governance system supports all stakeholders’ interest, one of which is 
the fulfillment of the need for environmental responsibility information made by a 
company. Upon fulfillment of the interest, the relationship between company and 
stakeholders will get better, in which it gains support, which will increase its firm value. 
 
Legitimacy Theory 
 
The legitimacy theory states that an organization should not only pay attention to 
investors’ interest but should also to the public interest in general (Deegan & Rankin, 
1997). The basis of legitimacy theory is the existence of a social contract between a 
company and the society where the company is located and uses its resources. The 
concept of social contract is that all social institutions, including companies, operate 
among the society through social contract, either explicitly or implicitly, in which their 
growth continuity is based on outcome which may socially be given to wide community 
and the economic, social or political benefits may be distributed to groups pursuant to 
their capacity. Any environmental activity disclosure made by a company is a form of its 
corporate responsibility for the utilization of existing resources. The social contract 
responsibility may be fulfilled with the support of a good governance system, which will 
then affect firm value. 
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Corporate Governance and Corporate Environmental Responsibility 
 
One agency problem arising in developing countries takes place between majority and 
minority owners (La Porta et al., 1999). This statement is supported by the research 
conducted by Tsamenyi et al. (2007) which tests the correlation between ownership 
structure (block holding) and disclosure made by Ghanaian companies. They find a 
negative and significant correlation between ownership structure (block holding) and 
voluntary disclosure made by multinational companies. 
 
In case of non-concentrated (spread) corporate ownership structure, the opportunity a 
company is owned by the public from various groups gets higher and, consequently, 
issues related to responsibility to the public gets more important. The higher the 
importance of public responsibility, the need for involvement in social and 
environmental activities will be higher, and so be the disclosure of responsibility activity 
(Ghazali, 2007). The same argument is stated by Tsamenyi et al. (2007), that the more 
concentrated a company’s shareholders, the lower the need for control and supervision 
is, and on the contrary, more spread corporate ownership structure requires higher 
supervision by improving corporate reporting transparency (disclosure). Dey (2008) 
proves that bigger company with more spread ownership, higher debt rate, and risk 
operation will have a bigger agency problem and, thus, better corporate governance. 
 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find a positive correlation between spread ownership and 
voluntary disclosure with Malaysian companies. The research conducted by Jo and 
Harjoto (2011, 2012) shows that bigger, older companies with better financial 
performance and more spread ownership structure tend to perform social 
responsibility. The results of previous research (Chau & Gray, 2002) also show a positive 
correlation between a company’s spread ownership and social activity disclosure. 
 
H1: Ownership concentration negatively influences corporate environmental 
responsibility. 
 
According to Herwidayatmo (2000), one of the reasons for weak governance practice in 
developing countries is auditor’s weak supervisory practice. Currently, Indonesia and 
Malaysia are aware of the importance of internal audit in their governance system. This 
is proven with the regulation of independent audit committee in corporate governance 
implementation and conditions to be fulfilled when a company is to go public 
(Committee, 2000; KNKG, 2006).  
 
Previous research has proven that the audit committee plays a role in the improvement 
of corporate governance quality (Said, Hj Zainuddin, & Haron, 2009). McMullen and 
Raghunandan (1996) and Wright (1996) find that independent audit committee 
composition is closely related to the company’s reporting quality. Audit committee 
serves an important role in reviewing corporate internal process and control to generate 
a quality report (Said et al., 2009). This shows that the audit committee composition 
reflects the quality of the audit as observable in such a corporate report. 
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Audit quality is not only observable in the corporate financial statement, but also 
voluntary corporate activity. Camfferman and Cooke (2002) and Haposoro (2012) prove 
a positive correlation between audit quality and information disclosure quality. This 
correlation takes place since more independent audit committee composition may 
reduce agency problems, which may improve internal control, including in influencing 
the corporate decision in the performance of environmental responsibility. 
 
H2: Audit quality positively influences corporate environmental responsibility. 
 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance 
 
According to the agency theory, the agency problem in company arises because of a 
conflict of interest between shareholders as the principal and manager as the agent. 
Agency cost then arises as to the result of the need for control and supervision so that 
the agent will act under the principal’s interest. Governance mechanism is a medium to 
reduce agency cost arising from conflict of interest between stakeholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). The ownership structure is one corporate governance mechanism which 
may control agency cost and thus increase firm value (Akbar & Hindasah, 2007). 
 
Agency conflict may influence firm value. Many types of research of correlation 
between corporate governance and performance have been conducted (Behbahani et 
al., 2013; Dey, 2008; Selarka, 2005; Siagian, Siregar, & Rahadian, 2013). In developing 
countries, information asymmetry takes places between majority and minority 
shareholders. This shows that there is a higher agency problem in companies with 
concentrated ownership structure than companies with spread ownership (Dey, 2008; 
Ghazali, 2007; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). Spread shareholding may be one mechanism to 
reduce agency cost in order to increase firm value. 
 
H3: Ownership concentration negatively influences firm value. 
 
Auditor plays a very important role in influencing the quality of an organization’s 
financial report. Gunawan and Halim (2012) state that information from professional 
auditor’s report will give more certainty and thus give higher reliability to financial 
statements to be issued. The Indonesian and Malaysian Governments have also 
obligated all companies registered with their stock exchange to have an audit 
committee of which some of its members are of the independent audit committee. The 
Independent audit committee may serve to oversee the agent’s performance, observe 
the internal control system, and test the credibility of accounting information presented 
by the agent (manager) (Siallagan & Machfoedz, 2006). All of the functions aim at 
putting high audit quality in order to increase firm value. The audit committee’s 
supervision and control are conducted in the prevention of manager’s moral hazard 
behavior, which will later influence firm value.  
 
Some researches have proven audit quality’s influence, which may be viewed from the 
existence of an independent audit committee, on firm value. Klein (2002) proves that 
the independent audit committee influences reported profit quality. Profit quality, as a 
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proxy of firm value, is lower with companies which establish independent audit 
committee compared with those which do not establish it. The same is proven by 
Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006). Their research also proves that independent audit 
committee influences firm value by reducing profit management and improve profit 
quality. McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) in their research state that investors, 
analysts, and regulators consider that audit committee contributes to increasing firm 
value through improving financial reporting quality. Bhattacharya (2001) defines a 
correlation between audit quality and client satisfaction which then influences 
corporate performance.  
 
H4: Audit quality positively influences firm value. 
 
Environmental Responsibility and Corporate Performance 
 
Environmental responsibility activity performed by a company is its responsibility for a 
social contract with the society in its surrounding environment where it operates. This 
may be a positive sign the company gives to the society which may later influence its 
corporate performance. One consideration of whether or not a company will perform 
environmental responsibility is the activity’s implication in the company, whether the 
benefits to be gained will be comparable to the effort (cost) it has incurred. The impacts 
of social and environmental responsibility on corporate performance have been tested 
in some researches. 
 
Generally, firm value is known as an economic measurement reflecting overall business 
values allocated to the company’s shareholders and holders of debt instruments (Malik, 
2014). Most of the researches find that companies which perform social and 
environmental responsibility have better performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson 
et al., 2008; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Mishra & Suar, 2010; Wan Ahamed et al., 2014). 
A meta-analysis related to such correlation has been conducted by Moser and Martin 
(2012) and concludes a positive correlation between social and environmental 
responsibility and corporate performance. 
 
H5: Corporate environmental responsibility positively influences firm value. 
 
Corporate Governance, Environmental Responsibility and Corporate Performance 
 
Corporate governance is deemed an effective mechanism to reduce agency problem 
resulted from conflict of interest between principal and agent (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) 
by disclosing corporate information (Rao et al., 2012) which will influence firm value 
(Tsamenyi et al., 2007). Jo and Harjoto (2012) test the correlation between corporate 
governance, social and environmental responsibility, and corporate financial 
performance. They find that the corporate governance of the previous period (lagged 
one year) positively influences corporate social and environmental responsibility. They 
state that corporate social and environmental responsibility activities are the extension 
of effective governance, which ensures the company’s sustainability with accountable 
and transparent business practice not only shareholders but also for wider community. 
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This conforms to the stakeholder theory that a company should use social and 
environmental responsibility activities as the extension of effective governance 
mechanism to settle the conflict of interest between manager and stakeholders. An 
effective governance mechanism should be positively correlated to the corporate 
decision in performing environmental responsibility activity, and there should be a 
positive correlation between such environmental responsibility decision and corporate 
performance since environmental responsibility mitigates conflict of interest between 
manager and stakeholders (stakeholder theory-based conflict resolution explanation). 
 
Since there is a conflict of interest between manager and stakeholders, social and 
environmental responsibility serves the role of conflict resolution set between both of 
them. Based on this correlation, the research result shows a positive correlation 
between corporate social and environmental responsibility. Their research also confirms 
the argument that social and environmental responsibility is the extension of effective 
corporate governance. Gibson and O’Donovan (2007) state that social and 
environmental responsibility positively influences corporate financial performance and 
also improves the company’s sustainability. An effective governance help company 
achieve it. 
 
H6: Corporate environmental responsibility mediates the correlation between corporate 
governance and performance. 
 
 
Research Method 
 
Data and Sample 
 
The data used in this research are obtained from the database of OSIRIS, Bursa Efek 
Indonesia, and Bursa Malaysia. The researcher conducts a content analysis to obtain 
environmental responsibility data. The population of this research is all companies 
registered with BEI and Bursa Malaysia. The research samples are all mining companies 
and top 50 manufacturing companies registered with BEI and Bursa Malaysia in 2013. 
The reason for the selection of mining and manufacturing sectors is that the two are 
environmentally sensitive industries. The top 50 is used for the manufacturing 
companies in avoidance of data inequality between both sectors. The research samples 
are determined by employing a purposive sampling with criteria (1) samples are 
registered as issuer with BEI and Bursa Malaysia in the period 2013, (2) samples are 
companies of top 50 market capitalization in manufacturing sector or registered with 
mining sector, (3) samples present annual report which ends in December 2013. 
 
Variable Measurement 
 
Corporate governance (CG) 
 
Ownership concentration (OWNCON) is measured from the ratio of shares held by 
majority shareholder as the total proportion of shares registered with stock exchange 
Ainy & Barokah 
Corporate Governance, Environmental Responsibility and Firm Value 
 
 
Journal of Accounting and Investment, May 2019 | 66 
(Ghazali, 2007). Audit quality (AUDITCOMM) is measured with the number of members 
of the independent audit committee of a company.  
 
Environmental Responsibility (EI) 
 
The researcher conducts a content analysis related to whether there is environmental 
responsibility information in the financial statement under GRI G4 guidelines. This 
research employs a 34 items checklist, the items of which are included in environmental 
category (EN1 – EN34). Score 1 will be given if the items of information in the guidelines 
are expressed in financial statement and 0 if otherwise. The environmental 
responsibility index of each company is calculated by summing up all the values of each 
company. 
 
 
Ʃ Xj  = Total environmental responsibility value of company j 
nj  = Total environmental responsibility value under GRI G4 
 
Firm Value (Q) 
 
Firm value is measured using Tobin’s Q value. Tobin’s Q measurement follows previous 
research (Chung & Pruitt, 1994) and is adapted to Indonesian condition (Darmawati & 
Rika, 2005).  
 
 
MVE  = share price x number of outstanding shares 
DEBT  = company’s total debt 
TA  = total assets 
 
Control Variables 
 
This research employs some control variables, which are company size, leverage, the 
board of directors’ structure, and sector. The control variable measurement, company 
size (SIZE), is measured with market capitalization value, while leverage control variable 
(LEVERAGE) is measured using a ratio of debt to equity. A dummy variable is employed 
to measure the control variables of the board of directors structure (Tier) and sector 
(SECTOR). The dummy variable for the board of directors structure (Tier) is 1 for 
Malaysian company and 0 for Indonesian company, while for the sector variable 
(SECTOR) is 1 for a manufacturing company and 0 for a mining company. 
 
Research Model 
 
According to Gujarati (2009), for a non-biased regression model or BLUE (Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimator), it is necessary to conduct classical assumption tests as a condition 
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of multiple regression analysis tests. The classical assumption tests which have been 
conducted are residual normality test, heteroscedasticity test, and multicollinearity test. 
For hypothesis testing, this research employs causal steps (Baron & Kenny, 1986) by 
estimating the following three regression equations: 
 
……………………………………….…… 1 
…………………………………………….. 2 
……………………….………… 3 
 
Where: 
EI = Corporate Environmental Responsibility (Environmental Index) 
CG = Corporate Governance 
Q = Firm Value 
 
Some conditions to be met to achieve mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986) are: 
 
a) Corporate governance should influence environmental responsibility with 
equation (1) (a ≠ 0). 
b) Corporate governance should influence firm value with equation (2) (c ≠ 0). 
c) Environmental responsibility should influence firm value with equation (3) (b ≠ 
0). 
 
Table 1 Sampling Summary 
No. Criteria Manufacturing Mining 
1 Companies registered with BEI and 
Bursa Malaysia 
100 58 
2 Companies excluded from the 
samples since: 
a. Companies change their sector 
b. Companies’ financial reporting 
period is other than 31 
December 
c. Companies have incomplete 
variable data 
 
 
(0) 
(0) 
 
 
(0) 
 
 
(6) 
(7) 
 
 
(1) 
 
3 Companies used as final samples 100 44 
Total Final Observations 144 
 
 
Result and Discussion 
 
Variables’ Descriptive Statistics 
 
This research employs 144 samples consisting of 100 manufacturing companies and 44 
mining companies. The samples are 64 Malaysian companies and 80 Indonesian 
companies (See Table 1). The variables’ descriptive statistics outline the distribution of 
the tested variables’ data. The summary of the variables’ descriptive statistics used in 
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this research is presented in Table 2. The results of descriptive statistics show that the 
samples’ average corporate environmental responsibility is low (0.212), with Malaysian 
companies’ environmental responsibility (0.109) is lower than that of Indonesian 
companies (0.293) and manufacturing companies’ average environmental responsibility 
(0.161) is lower than that of mining companies (0.327). Also, the results of descriptive 
statistics also show that the sample companies have low firm value and concentrated 
ownership structure. 
 
Table 2 Variables’ Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Sample Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Obs. 
Environ-
mental 
Respon-
sibility (EI) 
All 0.211 0.088 0.765 0.000 0.228 144 
Tier 1 0.109 0.059 0.765 0.000 0.166 64 
Tier 0 0.293 0.235 0.765 0.029 0.239 80 
Sector 1 0.161 0.088 0.765 0.000 0.192 100 
Sector 0 0.327 0.338 0.765 0.000 0.261 44 
Firm 
Value (Q) 
All 1.827 1.167 7.769 0.339 1.711 144 
Tier 1 1.615 1.069 7.769 0.406 1.576 64 
Tier 0 1.997 1.270 7.249 0.339 1.803 80 
Sector 1 2.052 1.224 7.769 0.339 1.938 100 
Sector 0 1.317 1.017 3.613 0.429 0.836 44 
Ownership 
Concen-
tration 
(OWNCON) 
All 0.437 0.429 0.982 0.006 0.232 144 
Tier 1 0.344 0.333 0.743 0.026 0.194 64 
Tier 0 0.512 0.519 0.982 0.006 0.234 80 
Sector 1 0.442 0.443 0.982 0.006 0.24 100 
Sector 0 0.426 0.407 0.850 0.026 0.216 44 
Audit 
Com-
mittee 
(AUDITCO
MM) 
All 1.181 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.437 144 
Tier 1 1.078 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.410 64 
Tier 0 1.263 1.000 2.000 1.000 0.443 80 
Sector 1 1.210 1.000 2.000 1.000 0.409 100 
Sector 0 1.114 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.493 44 
Leverage 
(LEVERAGE) 
All 0.488 0.343 2.823 -3.959 0.816 144 
Tier 1 0.499 0.349 2.823 0.000 0.597 64 
Tier 0 0.48 0.333 2.688 -3.959 0.959 80 
Sector 1 0.46 0.334 2.823 -3.959 0.735 100 
Sector 0 0.553 0.397 2.688 -3.94 0.982 44 
Company 
Size (SIZE) 
All 1,029,481 351,715.5 6,875,270 4,226,852 1,594,807 144 
Tier 1 875,238.0 291,817.3 5,830,860 8,288,893 1,421,048 64 
Tier 0 1,152,876 408,947.2 6,875,270 4,226,852 1,720,119 80 
Sector 1 1,203.323 395,364.0 6,8752,70 111,907.4 1,805,341 100 
Sector 0 634,385 257,257.4 2,855,967 4,226,852 851,135.9 44 
 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 
The three regression models have fulfilled the classical assumption tests, which are 
normality, multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity. The tests employed for normality 
and heteroscedasticity are Jarque-Bera (JB) and White. The multicollinearity assumption 
is tested by viewing the tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values. In 
fulfillment of the assumption, this research conducts a winsorizing of 3% data of outliers 
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and transformation of some variable data, which are an angular transformation for 
environmental responsibility (EI) variable and natural logarithm transformation for firm 
value (Q) and company size (SIZE) variable. 
 
Table 3 Results of Regression Analysis on Hypotheses 1 and 2 (Model 1) 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  -0.759 0.399 -1.901 0.0594* 
OWNCON - 0.403 0.187 2.160 0.0325** 
AUDITCOMM + 0.336 0.094 3.593 0.0005*** 
Control Variable      
LEVERAGE  0.056 0.049 1.149 0.2527 
SIZE  0.113 0.03 3.803 0.0002*** 
TIER  -0.332 0.089 -3.750 0.0003*** 
SECTOR  -0.472 0.092 -5.118 0.0000*** 
N 144     
R-squared 0.415     
Adjusted R-squared 0.389     
F-statistic 16.199     
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000***     
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; * significant at level 10% 
 
Table 3 presents a summary of the test results of hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypotheses 1 and 
2 aim at testing the correlation between corporate governance and corporate 
environmental responsibility. The results show that the coefficient of OWNCON variable 
is positive (0.403) and significant at level 5%. Thus H1 is not supported. It is evident that 
ownership concentration positively influences environmental responsibility. This result 
conforms to the argument of Jensen and Meckling (1976) stating that a company with a 
concentrated ownership structure has lower agency problem since fewer parties own it. 
The parties have more power and willingness to monitor managers’ behavior since they 
are more bound to the company with their big ownership. It is the control and 
monitoring which encourage managers to perform environmental responsibility under 
stakeholders’ interest (Chau & Gray, 2002).  Hossain, M. Tan, and Adams, (1994)   and  
Chau and Gray  (2002)  support the argument through their research which shows a 
positive correlation between concentrated ownership structure and voluntary 
information disclosure by Malaysian, Hong Kong, and Singaporean companies. 
 
The coefficient of AUDITCOMM variable is positive (0.336) and significant at level 1%. 
Thus H2 is supported. It is evident that audit quality positively influences environmental 
responsibility. Independent audit committee plays an important role in reviewing 
processes taking place in the company, including the decision of whether or not to 
perform a voluntary activity like environmental responsibility. 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 in this research test the influence of corporate governance on firm 
value, of which results are presented in Table 4. The regression output of hypothesis 
test in Table 4 shows that the coefficient of OWNCON variable is insignificant (0.876). 
Thus H3 is not supported. Ownership concentration does not influence firm value. 
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Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) in their research explain that there is no systematic 
correlation between ownership structure variance (either concentrated or spread) and 
firm value variance. In their opinion, a company’s ownership structure is the result of a 
decision which reflects the influence of shareholders and trade in the market. When a 
private company decides to offer its shares to the public, this means that its 
shareholders decide to make the ownership structure more spread. On the contrary, in 
the case of a public company acquisition, its ownership structure change to be more 
concentrated. That there is no correlation between ownership structure and firm value 
may also be explained with the argument that, either concentrated or spread, the 
company’s purpose is to maximize shareholders’ interest (prosperity), one of which is to 
increase firm value. 
 
Table 4 Results of Regression Analysis on Hypotheses 3 and 4 (Model 2) 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  -1.234 0.265 -4.666 0.0000*** 
OWNCON - 0.019 0.124 0.156 0.876 
AUDITCOMM + 0.022 0.062 0.353 0.725 
Control Variable      
LEVERAGE  -0.081 0.032 -2.504 0.014** 
SIZE  0.107 0.02 5.431 0.000*** 
TIER  -0.052 0.059 -0.885 0.378 
SECTOR  0.049 0.061 0.803 0.424 
N 144     
R-squared 0.272     
Adjusted R-squared 0.24     
F-statistic 8.522     
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000*     
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; * significant at level 10% 
 
The coefficient of AUDITCOMM variable is insignificant (0.725). Thus H4 is not 
supported. This research is unable to prove the influence of audit quality on firm value. 
Audit committee does not reduce the existing agency problem in the company and does 
not influence firm value. The number of independent audit committee members is not 
relevant information to society. Thus the market does not respond to such information. 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and Indonesian General Guideline to Good 
Corporate Governance have regulated the existence of independent members in the 
company’s audit committee (Committee, 2000; KNKG, 2006). Because of the suggestion, 
the market does not pay attention to the performance and impacts of the existence of 
independent members. 
 
Hypothesis 5 tests the influence of corporate environmental responsibility on firm 
value, while hypothesis 6 aims at proving an indirect correlation between corporate 
governance and firm value, with the mediation of environmental responsibility. The test 
results of hypotheses 5 and 6 are presented in Table 5. The regression output of 
hypothesis test in table 5 shows that the coefficient of EI variable is insignificant (0.213). 
Thus H5 is not supported. Environmental responsibility does not influence firm value. 
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The low average value of EI variable in this research shows that Malaysian and 
Indonesian companies’ awareness of the importance of environmental responsibility is 
still low. This conforms to the research conducted by Tsamenyi et al. (2007) that social 
and environmental responsibility in developing countries is still low. This may also be 
viewed from the low number of companies in both countries that issue a follow-up 
report separately from the annual report. Company’s decision not to perform 
environmental responsibility may be caused by investors’ tendency not to pay attention 
to environmental responsibility the companies have conducted when they decide to 
invest, consequently, the environmental responsibility does not influence the concerned 
company’s firm value. The market does not respond to corporate environmental 
responsibility, under the research conducted by Gelb and Zarowin (2002) that social and 
environmental responsibility disclosure does not make share price more informative. 
 
Table 5 Results of Regression Analysis on Hypotheses 5 and 6 (Model 3) 
 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C  -1.299 0.274 -4.733 0.000*** 
OWNCON - 0.054 0.125 0.43 0.668 
AUDITCOMM + 0.051 0.074 0.682 0.496 
EI + -0.085 0.068 -1.252 0.213 
Control Variable      
LEVERAGE  -0.076 0.034 -2.225 0.028 
SIZE  0.117 0.019 6.08 0.000*** 
TIER  -0.080 0.076 -1.050 0.296 
SECTOR  0.009 0.067 0.130 0.897 
N 144     
R-squared 0.284     
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.247     
F-statistic 7.702     
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000*     
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; * significant at level 10% 
 
The mediation correlation in H6 may be tested if the three conditions are fulfilled (Baron 
& Kenny, 1986). Non-fulfillment of conditions b and c will result in impractical testing of 
environmental responsibility as mediation of correlation between corporate governance 
and firm value. This mediation correlation pattern does not occur in developing 
countries. Thus H6 is not supported. Environmental responsibility has deemed an 
extension of effective corporate governance, a medium to solve the existing conflict of 
interest between manager and stakeholders (Jo & Harjoto, 2012) which will later 
influence firm value. This research is unable to prove that environmental responsibility 
mitigates existing agency problems as presented by Jo and Harjoto (2012). This shows 
that environmental responsibility does not add information value to reduce conflict of 
interest. 
 
Market non-responsiveness in developing country to environmental responsibility 
conducted by a company (H5) also confirms that environmental responsibility does not 
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have information value in the country since it is deemed not providing information of 
the company’ prospect. That TIER variable is proven not to significantly influence the 
regression model 3 confirms the argument, showing that Malaysian and Indonesian 
markets have not considered environmental responsibility as material information in 
the investment decision. The implication of uninformative environmental responsibility 
is that firm value is not influenced by such responsibility. This reconfirms that 
environmental responsibility cannot directly mediate corporate governance and firm 
value in developing countries.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This research proves the legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory that a company 
cannot be separated from a social context and is responsible for fulfilling not only its 
shareholders’ interest but also that of all stakeholders. Environmental responsibility is a 
realization of effort to fulfill social contract and stakeholders’ interest. Market’s low 
response to environmental responsibility proves that environmental responsibility does 
not directly mediate the correlation between corporate governance and firm value. This 
research proves that there is not a mediation correlation pattern as proven by Jo and 
Harjoto (2012) in developing countries. The results of this research are expected to be a 
reflection for the government and the society in developing countries (particularly 
Indonesia and Malaysia) in order to be aware of the importance of environmental 
responsibility. Government’s role in each country is very important in its realization. 
 
This research is limited that it only takes 50 big companies of manufacturing sector so 
that the number of samples from both sectors is not too far. Therefore, it is likely to 
influence this research’ external validity. Consequently, readers are expected to 
carefully interpret the results of this research. Further research may employ more 
samples, either with more years of observation or extension of sectors of samples used. 
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